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Most national governments exercise sovereignty over
large geographic areas, comprising a multitude of economically diverse cities and politically heterogeneous regions.
Unlike local governments, which typically must spend
revenues in the same area in which they are raised, national
governments face no such constraints and can effectively
redistribute funds from one area to another by letting some
areas receive more spending, net of taxes, than others. While
an enormous literature has studied the causes and consequences of taxation and spending at the purely national and
purely local levels, surprisingly little research has examined
how or why national governments may tax and spend differently across different areas.
The first and main chapter of the dissertation explains
how a simple federal income tax, levied according to the
same tax formula across areas, will fall more heavily on
some areas than others, affecting the distribution of employment, wages, and property values nationwide. This happens
because otherwise identical workers get paid different wages
due to cost-of-living and quality-of-life differences across
areas. Workers are effectively taxed for living in areas where
firms offer higher wages. According to Roback (1982), when
workers are fully mobile, these are areas that are either more
efficient in producing goods traded across cities, offer a
lower quality-of-life, or have inefficient housing sectors.
The federal tax differences workers pay are simply proportional to the marginal federal tax rate times the wage premium a worker earns for taking a job in a given city, relative
to the national average. Since the effective federal marginal
tax rate is close to 35 percent, the standard deviation of wage
differences across cities is 13 percent (see below), and threequarters of income accrues to labor, these tax differentials
across cities have a standard deviation of about 3 percent of
total income. These differences are similar in magnitude to
local tax differences, except that higher federal taxes are not
compensated for with higher federal spending. This creates a
tax wedge that encourages workers to live in low-wage areas
rather than high-wage areas, resulting in an inefficient distribution of employment nationwide. Furthermore, less-mobile
workers and land owners in high-wage cities disproportionately bear federal taxes and are made worse off than under a
system of neutral geographic taxation.
Several policies can be used to alter the distribution of
federal taxes across regions, some of which have been suggested, albeit less rigorously, by economists and policymakers. Indexing federal taxes to local wage levels so that work-
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ers in different cities have their taxable incomes adjusted to
reflect what they would earn in an average city is the proper
way to equalize taxes and make employment distributed
efficiently. Creating such an index presents a number of practical challenges. The arguably easier task of indexing taxes
to cost of living can improve efficiency by helping workers
locate closer to good-paying jobs in expensive areas; it can
also induce too many workers to live in areas with a high
quality of life by effectively subsidizing the consumption
of local amenities that lead to higher costs. Cost-of-living
indexation will improve locational efficiency only if cost of
living varies across cities sufficiently from worker productivity differences rather than from quality-of-life differences.
The chapter also shows that existing provisions in the tax
code that lower the after-tax price of owner-occupied housing already act as a mild form of cost-of-living indexation.
As the demand for housing is price inelastic, when individuals move to more expensive areas, their expenditures on
housing rise. However, as the demand for housing is not perfectly inelastic, housing expenditures rise less than one-forone with the price level. Because of this, and because not all
cost-of-living differences are due to housing costs, these tax
provisions only serve to index taxes partially to local costs of
living. Furthermore, across areas with the same price level,
workers in areas with a higher quality of life earn lower
wages (they are in less-productive areas) and thus consume
less in housing as well as other goods. Because of this, tax
benefits for owner-occupied housing do not benefit workers
in nicer areas as much as prices alone would suggest.
U.S. census microdata on individuals and housing from
2000 are used to estimate wage and cost-of-living differences
across metropolitan areas in the United States, seen in Figure
3, following a methodology similar to Beeson and Eberts
(1989). Calculations from these differences demonstrate that
federal tax differences in the United States, seen in Figure 4,
are quite large, and that tax-benefits to owner-occupied housing reduce these differences, but only by a small amount.
Overall, workers who live in areas offering above-average
nominal wages pay an average federal tax rate of almost 20
percent, while otherwise identical workers in cities offering
below-average wages pay an average federal tax rate under
15 percent. This difference of roughly 5 percent of total
income is higher than many state sales tax rates. The difference between the most-taxed area, the San Francisco Bay
Area, and the least-taxed area, rural South Dakota, is almost
14 percent of total income, a difference that swamps almost
all local and state tax differences.
An analysis using data from the Consolidated Federal
Funds Report reveals that cities paying higher federal taxes
are not compensated with higher federal spending: federal
tax and spending differences across metro areas appear
uncorrelated. Thus, unlike higher local taxes, higher federal
taxes are particularly burdensome for local economies as
they are not compensated for with higher levels of spend-
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ing. This analysis bolsters the conclusion of Senator Patrick
Moynihan in his 24 years of reports, entitled The Federal
Budget and the States, that the “federal balance of payments”
across areas is highly unequal, showing that this conclusion
continues to hold even after controlling for the differing
characteristics of individuals across areas.
Using these estimates, a calibrated general equilibrium
model—similar in some ways to that in Rappaport (2006)—
is used to gauge the long-run effect on metro areas of federal
tax differences, present since the two world wars. This model
finds that federal taxes have lowered housing and land values
by roughly 4 and 25 percent in high-wage cities, while
similarly raising values in low-wage areas. Furthermore,
based on estimates in Bartik (1991) and other evidence, it appears that long-run employment is about 15 percent lower in
both high- and low-wage areas than under a geographically
neutral federal tax system. The simulation lends credence
to the observation made by journalist Malcolm Gladwell
(1996) that “the decline of northeastern American cities
may be due… to the emptying of their coffers by the federal
government.”
The redistribution of employment across cities caused by
federal taxes creates locational inefficiencies worth about
0.28 percent of income, or $34 billion, in 2005. This efficiency cost is similar in size to the efficiency cost due to tax
benefits for owner-occupied housing.
Policy simulations reveal a number of interesting conclusions. First, while wage-indexation of taxes would be superior to cost-of-living indexation, cost-of-living indexation
appears to be superior to no indexation at all, even if the
tax-benefits to owner-occupied housing are retained. Second,
increasing tax-benefits to owner-occupied housing would
help to equalize federal taxes somewhat and would lower
the efficiency cost due to worker misallocation across cities,
but would lead to a welfare loss overall as the efficiency cost
increase in the housing-consumption market would be even
greater.
The research in this dissertation goes well beyond what
the previous literature had discovered about how federal
taxes interact with local prices, a literature that is too narrow or informal to guide policy comprehensively. Wildasin
(1980) notes that federal taxes on labor income may cause
workers to locate inefficiently, but he does not describe this
as unequal federal taxation or discuss its impact on local
economies. Glaeser (1998) argues that federal transfers
should not be tied to local price levels, as this effectively
subsidizes workers to live in high quality-of-life cities. Considering also productivity differences across cities, Kaplow
(1996) and Knoll and Griffith (2003) argue that there may be
a benefit of indexing taxes to local wage levels, but do not
provide a quantitative assessment of how this would change
things relative to the current unindexed system. The unequal
geographic distribution of tax benefits for owner-occupied
housing is measured by Gyourko and Sinai (2003), although
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they do not consider how these interact with the overall
distribution of federal taxes or control for differences in the
population across metro areas.
The policy discussion and simulations in this paper provide some guidance to the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax
Reform (2005), which recommended cutting tax deductions
for local taxes and home-mortgage interest. According to the
simulation, this would produce efficiency gains, although
it would make federal taxes more unequal across areas and
make workers locate even more inefficiently across cities.
The simulations are also useful in analyzing the proposal
that tax deductions for home mortgage interest be indexed
to local price levels. For individuals who consume just over
the cap, this would produce a stronger form of cost-of-living
indexation, as the size of the deduction increases one-for-one
with the price level for housing. This opens up the possibility
of capping deductions to keep individuals from consuming
too much housing on the margin, while still helping individuals purchase housing close to high-paying jobs.
Also within this chapter are several methodological contributions to the areas of quality of life, amenity valuation,
and worker mobility across metro ares. Hedonic estimates of
quality of life across cities are measured according to how
high the cost of living in a city is relative to its local wagelevel. The model used in the dissertation adjusts the standard
hedonic model seen in previous work (e.g., Blomquist et al.
1988) to account for federal taxes, nonhousing costs, and
nonlabor income. This produces quality-of-life estimates that
are much more favorable to cities on the coasts and to larger
cities. For instance, Santa Barbara, Honolulu, and San Francisco are ranked in the top five, while previously these had
ranked these far lower. Later work (Albouy 2008) shows that
these adjusted quality-of-life estimates produce city rankings
closer to those in the popular press and that the calibrated
model accurately predicts how housing prices rise with wage
levels, controlling for amenities. Further empirical analysis
reveals that good weather and coastal location alone account
for a majority of quality-of-life differences.
A number of insights on how the values of amenities
are capitalized into local prices are also developed. These
amenities can not only include fixed characteristics such
as weather, but also policy variables such as public infrastructure, spending initiatives, and local taxes. Federal taxes
increase the local value of amenities that improve quality-oflife or efficiency in the housing sector, while they decrease
the value of amenities that are good for businesses that sell
goods tradable across cities. Standard formulas used to value
amenities need to be adjusted to measure the true economic
value of amenities, rather than the local value after changes
in federal tax burden. This work also models how amenities
are capitalized differently into housing prices than in land
prices because housing services are produced using local
labor and mobile capital, as well as land. Because land values only make up a fraction of home values, formulas must
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take into account that a small percentage increase in housing
value will reflect a much larger percentage increase in land
value. Also, when land values are not available, amenities
that increase the productivity in the tradable sector cannot be
readily distinguished from amenities that decrease productivity in the housing (nontradable) sector, as both lead to higher
housing prices and wages.
Extension of the model discussed in the Appendix incorporate an elegant adaptation of the Roback framework to
account for imperfect mobility, modeled through the heterogeneity of tastes or attachments for living in a particular city.
This adaptation uses a single parameter that maps directly to
the elasticity of local labor supply, measured in number of
employees, or the elastic of demand of households to live in
that particular city. Estimates of this mobility parameter can
then be used to adjust formulas of how changes in federal
taxes or local amenities affect local wages, employment,
and land and housing values. The situations where workers
are perfectly mobile or immobile are treated as special cases
of when the mobility parameter takes on values of zero or
infinity.
Of course, reforms to equalize the distribution of taxation
and spending across regions require political approval. Most
practical reforms would require some areas to receive less in
federal funds while others would gain, generating a political conflict across regions. How such conflict is resolved
is a common theme in distributional politics. In the United
States, equalizing the distribution of federal taxes across areas would likely lead to partisan conflict, as most high-wage
areas tend to elect Democratic representatives at the federal
level, while many low-wage areas tend to elect Republican
representatives, reflecting the so-called “red-state/blue-state”
division of the country.
The second chapter of the dissertation considers how the
partisan makeup of an area’s federal legislative representatives can influence the type or amount of spending that area
receives. The standard legislative bargaining model of Baron
and Ferejohn (1987) is adapted to incorporate political parties, which is used to model how power imbalances can arise
between majority and minority parties for at least two reasons. First, members of the majority party may have greater
ability to propose spending bills, which are destined to favor
the proposer. Second, with majority voting and sufficient party-discipline, spending bills can be passed using only votes
from members of the majority party, thus excluding members
of the minority, who are then less likely to receive distributional benefits. Furthermore, with a breakdown in electoral
competition, ideological differences between parties imply
that the party affiliation of a representative may influence the
composition of spending his district receives, favoring some
types of spending over others.
Looking at the U.S. Congress, it is difficult to tease out
these different bargaining effects from the data, as the actual
bargaining process is more complicated than in a simple

2008 Dissertation Summaries

game-theoretic model. Nevertheless, some interesting patterns emerge from the data. Empirical estimates—using
within-state variation based on fixed-effect and (quasi-experimental) regression-discontinuity designs—find that states
represented by congressmen in the majority receive greater
federal grants, especially in transportation. Weaker evidence
suggests this greater bargaining power comes more from
party-coalition effects than from proposal power differences.
States represented by Republican congressmen receive
substantially more defense spending than those represented
by Democratic congressmen; the latter receive significantly
more spending for education.
Until recently, disentangling ideological effects from
majority effects had been almost impossible with existing data as Democrats held the majority in the Senate until
1980 and the House until 1994. The only existing work in
the area, Levitt and Snyder (1995), is purely cross-sectional,
confounding Democratic with majority status, and finds no
effect by geographic area. This chapter suggests that partisan
representation is important but not overwhelming in determining the geographic distribution of federal funds.
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